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EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN ILLINOIS
Richard C. Turkington*
Equal protection of the laws has become a topic of growing
importance in Illinois since the ratification of the 1970 Constitu-
tion. While federal equal protection standards have always
played a dominant role in state decisions, the federal constitu-
tion provides that a state can extend protection against discrim-
ination beyond the federal provisions. Professor Turkington
pointedly notes that expansion of rights beyond the federal
equal protection standard was only effectively accomplished
through the special legislation prohibition of the 1870 Constitu-
tion. By sharp contrast the new state constitution recognizes the
inadequacies of the federal equal protection clause by specific
supplementary provisions referring to discrimination based
upon sex or directed at the physically or mentally handicapped.
Included is a discussion of recent Illinois court interpretations
of the state constitution which illustrate that Illinois has relin-
quished a subordinate position and has come to the forefront in
the protection of citizens against certain forms of governmental
injustice.
Equal protection of the laws is a subject which has become
extremely complicated in Illinois since the ratification of the 1970
Constitution. The 1870 Constitution contained no equal protec-
tion clause,' although some governmental discriminations were
proscribed by a prohibition against "special legislation."2 In stark
contrast, the 1970 Constitution guarantees equal protection of the
law' and specifically protects persons against discrimination in
employment and the sale or rental of property, on the basis of
* Professor, DePaul University College of Law, B.A., J.D. Wayne State University,
L.L.M. New York University. To write on the subject of equal protection of the laws
without consulting Jeffrey Shaman would be extremely remiss. I am grateful for the
numerous insights my colleague has given me in the preparation of this Article. The
author also wishes to acknowledge the valuable research contributions made by Jeff Atkin-
son, a law student at DePaul.
1. Some Illinois courts found an equal protection clause implied in the due process
provision of the text. See, e.g., Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill.2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968);
Marallis v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N.E. 394 (1932); People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23,
136 N.E. 505 (1922).
2. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (1870).
3. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2, see note 34 infra.
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race, color, creed, national ancestry, sex, or the condition of being
physically or mentally handicapped.4 An additional specific pro-
hibition against sex discrimination by local and state governmen-
tal units is found in article I, section 18. 5 The prohibition against
special legislation was carried over as well.6
The supremacy and equal protection clauses of the Federal
Constitution, of course, operate as limitations on both the laws
and constitution of a state.7 Federal equal protection standards
therefore become the starting point for analysis of equal protec-
tion in Illinois. While a state constitution may expand protection
against discrimination beyond that provided citizens by the Fed-
eral Constitution, it may not restrict rights granted citizens by
the United States Constitution. Moreover, as Illinois and other
state high courts have recently learned, a state court, as a matter
of federal constitutional law, may not impose greater restrictions
on police power than those imposed by the United States Su-
preme Court.' The interrelationship between state and federal
constitutional standards thus becomes quite important. This is
particularly true in the equal protection area, since the Supreme
Court has interpreted the federal equal protection clause so as to
provide virtually no protection against governmental discrimina-
tions which solely effect property or contract interests9 or which
discriminate against the poor in the distribution of forms of pub-
lic largess. 0
4. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 17, 19, see notes 36-37 infra.
5. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18, see note 35 infra.
6. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13, see note 38 infra.
7. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
8. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971). The Court is carrying over a philosophy of non-intervention in the economic area
which had the support of the Warren and earlier courts. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963); Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
10. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). There is,
however, some protection against discriminations directed at the poor in other areas.
Compare Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), with Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
[Vol. 25:385
ILLINOIS EQUAL PROTECTION
FEDERAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In constitutional adjudication under the fourteenth amend-
ment the federal judiciary has repeatedly said that the equal
protection clause requires public activity to be reasonable." In
1948, Professors Tussman and tenBroek unpacked the concept of
reasonableness in a seminal article." They observed that reasona-
bleness in equal protection cases has been employed in the con-
text of purposeful public activity. The concept essentially has
described a relationship between the method employed by public
authority and the purpose for which the authority is exercised.
Tussman and tenBroek pointed out that this means-ends analy-
sis, embodied in the concept of reasonableness, involves several
potentially distinct relationships. Sometimes the method utilized
will promote the governmental purpose but overreaches in that
it affects more persons than it needs to; sometimes the opposite
will be true and the means chosen under reaches in that it affects
fewer persons than it needs to; and sometimes the method used
both under and overreaches.' 3 Thus, legislative methods which
are broader or narrower than necessary are reasonable but in an
imperfect way. Such methods promote the governmental interest
but could be more perfectly reasonable if the subjects of the pub-
lic action were only those persons who need to be reached.
Central to an operational understanding of the reasonableness
concept is recognition that the court has adopted a double stan-
dard in its employment. Since 1937, the federal judiciary in
numerous cases has chosen not to review the reasonableness of
public activity where equal protection claims have been raised
against governmental action affecting individual property or con-
tract interests.'4 Non-review of reasonableness in these cases is
11. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949).
13. Tussman and tenBroek use the terms "over inclusive" and "under inclusive." In
the text of this Article overreaching and under reaching will be used synonymously with
over inclusive and under inclusive. The classic example of public activity which is both
under inclusive and over inclusive is the World War I Japanese relocation order which
was upheld against equal protection claims by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
14. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT, 8-29 (2d ed. 1972); Karst, Invidious
Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process
1976]
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accompanied by judicial recitation of a "presumption of reasona-
bleness," and the slogan that the legislature may deal with a
problem "one step at a time" or a variation on that theme. 5 A
major characteristic of these non-scrutiny cases is that a govern-
mental purpose may not even be articulated; the court will hy-
pothesize one.8
In certain cases since 1937, an opposite presumption has been
invoked and rigid scrutiny of the reasonableness of public author-
ity has occurred. When this happens, the court requires the gov-
ernment to show that the means employed are necessary for the
accomplishment of a compelling state interest. In rigid scrutiny
cases, imperfect reasonableness is constitutionally fatal. By the
end of the Warren Court era in 1969,1 a majority of the court
took the view that rigid scrutiny and the presumption against
reasonableness were licensed in cases where the government ac-
tion discriminated against a suspect class or an interest, other
than property or contract, which the Court designated as funda-
mental. A majority of the present Court also concurs in this dis-
tinction.'" Classes designated as "suspect" include race,'9 nation-
ality, or alienage; 0 interests treated as "fundamental" are
speech, association, religion,' privacy,2 and interstate travel.3
This two-tier standard of review has come to be the official
theory of equal protection. As several writers have pointed out,
Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716 (1969); Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in
Constitutional Adjudication: Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the
Establishment of a Viable Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q.
153 (1975).
15. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
16. Id.
17. For an exhaustive account of the development of the two-tier approach until the
end of the Warren Court era, see Development-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
18. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
19. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. In re Griffins, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
21. Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
22. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
[Vol. 25:385
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however, this theory will not adequately explain employment of
substantive review on equal protection grounds in several recent
cases where both state and federal action have been found uncon-
stitutional. 4 Preferential and detrimental governmental distinc-
tions based on gender or directed at illegitimate children or the
indigent, for example, have been scrutinized rather than sub-
jected to the presumption of reasonableness. 5 This development
has produced a spirited debate and various alternative equal pro-
tection theories have been proffered to supplant the official view.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" 6 and Professor Gunther's "in-
termediate tier means-oriented' 27 position probably are the most
influential of the newer approaches. The extent and continuation
of critical comment in this area, however, suggests that a work-
able new conceptual framework yet to be written may be the
consensus theory of the future.2 1
Although there is considerable instability in the federal courts'
approach to cases which do not quite fit into either of the extreme
24. See Fielding, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal
Protection, 40 U. CI. L. REV. 807 (1973); Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental
Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 479 (1973); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under
the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62
GEo. L. J. 1071 (1974); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975); Note, The Decline
and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
25. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (gender); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(gender); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate children); James v. Strange,
407 U.S. 128 (1972) (indigents); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigents);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigents).
26. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973)(Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall would end the rigid "tier" approach. In its stead he would
determine the level of judicial scrutiny by evaluating: (1) the relationship between the
individual interest effected and constitutionally guaranteed rights; (2) the relationship
between the class effected and "suspect classes"; (3) the importance of the governmental
interest promoted. The level of scrutiny warranted would depend primarily upon the
closeness of the relationship in categories (1) and (2).
27. See Gunther, supra note 24. Professor Gunther supports meaningful scrutiny in non-
suspect or non-fundamental interest cases. He suggests that purposes should be articu-
lated and means established to bear a fair and substantial relationship to legitimate ends
in such cases. He does not support review of the significance of articulated purposes
outside the rigid scrutiny area and would limit judicial scrutiny in cases which involve
intractable, economic, social and philosophical questions.
28. See note 24 supra.
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tiers of the official equal protection theory,29 it is possible to iden-
tify some patterns in the employment of constitutional review in
this area. Where the discrimination is directed at sexual groups
or illegitimates, the nature of judicial scrutiny more nearly ap-
proximates that of rigid scrutiny than the minimal scrutiny ap-
plicable to purely economic legislation. It appears, for example,
that in these cases it is not the habit of courts to presume or
judicially hypothesize valid purposes which have not been articu-
lated by public authority." It also appears that furtherance of
administrative or economic efficiency is not a defense." There is
also an indication that it is not inappropriate for courts to evalu-
ate and even set aside the articulated purpose if evidence of a
contrary purpose is strongly supported in legislative history.32
Scrutiny of sexual discrimination is distinguishable from scrutiny
in suspect classification cases, however, in an important regard.
More allowance for over and under reaching is tolerated in cases
where a benefit is distributed to women for the purpose of undo-
ing the effects of past discrimination than in cases involving a
suspect class or fundamental interest."
STATE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Article I, section 2, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution guarantees
equal protection of the laws to all persons. 4 This general provi-
sion, essentially paralleling the equal protection language of the
fourteenth amendment, is supplemented in the 1970 Illinois Con-
stitution with proscriptions against discriminations directed at
specific groups by government units and private employers or
other individuals. Section 18 of article I specifically extends pro-
tection against denial of equal protection of the laws "on account
29. Compare Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 120 (1956) with Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974) and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
30. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 688 (1968).
31. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
32. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 419 U.S. 636 (1975).
33. Compare Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974), with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
34. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 reads: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws."
[Vol. 25:385
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of sex" by the state or its units of local government and school
districts. 5 Section 17 states that "all persons" shall be free from
discrimination "in the hiring and promotion practices of any
employer or in the sale or rental of property."38 This same protec-
tion is extended to physically or mentally handicapped persons
in section 19.11 In addition, article IV, section 13 prohibits the
passage of "special legislation" by the General Assembly." This
multifaceted textual basis for protection against discrimination
in the Illinois Constitution differs considerably from the single-
open-textured protection embodied in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the Federal Constitution.
In the five years that have passed since adoption of the 1970
Constitution there have been relatively few decisions interpreting
the skeletal language of the document. Since case law is more
important than the actual textual language of a constitution,39 it
is too soon to fully understand all of the new provisions of the new
Illinois Constitution. Yet, from the plain meaning and legislative
history of article I, sections 17 and 19, it is evident that they
clearly apply to certain kinds of private discrimination in employ-
ment and in the sale or rental of property by private individuals.
35. Art. I, § 18 reads: "The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged
on account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts."
36. Art. I, § 17 reads:
All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
race, color, and, national ancestry and sex in any hiring and promotion practices
of any employer or in the sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the General Assembly, but the
General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these
rights and provide additional remedies for their violation.
37. Article I, section 19 reads:
All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be free from discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of property and shall be free from discrimination
unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer.
Section 19 does not have self-executing language. The fact that such language is found in
section 17 may raise the question as to the scope of the provision. One writer has suggested
that section 19 is self-executing by reason of section 12. Gertz, Hortatory Language in the
Preamble and Bill of Rights of the 1970 Constitution, 6 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRACT. & PRO.
217, 234 (1973). Since the General Assembly has passed implementing legislation the
matter is to some extent academic. ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 38 §§ 65-21 et seq. (1973).
38. Art. IV, § 13 reads: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when
a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made
applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination."
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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As such they represent a strong state policy against discrimina-
tion in important aspects of private life. These provisions expand
state constitutional protection considerably beyond the protec-
tion against discrimination afforded by the Federal Constitution,
which essentially is limited to federal or state action."
Rigid Judicial Scrutiny in Illinois
Broad license to review public action directed at suspect classes
or affecting fundamental interests is granted to the federal judici-
ary. When government action is directed at racial minorities,
aliens, or nationalities, or affects a personal interest in speech,
association, religion, privacy, or interstate travel under the equal
protection clauses of both the fourteenth amendment and the
Illinois Constitution, rigid judicial scrutiny is required. The
merger of federal and state standards in these areas inescapably
follows from the preemptive effect of the federal standards by
virtue of the supremacy clause and the essentially identical broad
language of article I, section 2 and the fourteenth amendment. It
is therefore not surprising that this interpretation has already
been given to article I, section 2, by the Illinois Supreme Court.4
A major question that emerges from supplementary text embod-
ied in the special legislation provision and sections 17, 18 and 19
of the Illinois Constitution is to what extent, if any, these provi-
sions expand state constitutional protection beyond that granted
in the Federal Constitution. Sufficient case law interpreting some
of these provisions has occurred since 1971 to formulate a prelimi-
nary answer to this question.
Suspect Classifications
The special role of the judiciary in protecting suspect groups
40. The United States Supreme Court has reached some private action under an ex-
panded interpretation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See,
e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961). Some private conspiracies come within the scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Private racial discrimination in
housing may be reached under the thirteenth amendment. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred
Meyers, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
41. See In re Estate of Karas, 61 Ill.2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975); Ill. State Employees
Ass'n v. Walker, 57 I1. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974).
[Vol. 25:385
ILLINOIS EQUAL PROTECTION
against abusive governmental action is supported by notions of
fairness and a practical assessment of the political process. Race,
nationality, and alienage are accidents of birth for which the
person is not responsibile; such characteristics are not ordinarily
relevant to proper subjects of police power. The express selection
of these groups as subjects of public action often implies their
inferior status and stigmatizes members of the group. Moreover,
each of these discrete and insular minority groups has been
politically disadvantaged at some time by legally endorsed and
supported discrimination. These groups, therefore, in particular
need and deserve judicial protection from unfavorable legislation
resulting from a majoritarian political process. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST GENDER DISCRIMINATIONS IN
ILLINOIS
Despite rather obvious similarities between the laws directed
at race, nationality and alienage and laws discriminating against
women, as of this writing five Justices of the United States Su-
preme Court have not found sex to be a suspect classification. In
Frontiero v. Richardson,4" a 1973 decision, Justices Brennan,
Douglas, White, and Marshall grounded their invalidation of a
rule discriminating against female officers in respect to depen-
dancy allowances on the basis that sex classifications were sus-
pect and subject to rigid scrutiny. Justice Rehnquist dissented
and clearly would not extend suspect classification status to sex.
Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Stewart found it unneces-
sary to treat the sex classification in the case as suspect to invali-
date the policy. Since Frontiero, several sex classifications have
been adjudicated by the Court, but without relying on the suspect
classification.44 In the latest sex discrimination case Stanton v.
42. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964)(per curiam); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S.
144 n. 4 (1938) (Stone J., concurring); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562, (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting.) Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879); Hobsen v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d
529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Karst, supra note 14.
43. 41f U.S. 677 (1973).
44. See Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 419 U.S. 636 (1975) where the court found a social
security policy excluding widowers from receiving benefits in the event of the death of an
19761
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Stanton,5 eight Justices found a Utah statute defining the age of
majority as 18 for females and 21 for males for purposes of support
payments an unconstitutional gender classification without dis-
cussing the suspect classification question.
There are three sections of article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitu-
tion which have a bearing on discrimination against persons of a
particular sex. Section 2 provides that no person shall be denied
equal protection of the laws. Section 17 specifically prohibits sex-
ual discrimination in the hiring and promoting practices of any
employer or in the sale or rental of property. Section 18 prohibits
the "state or its unit of local government and school districts"
from denying equal protection of the laws "on account of sex." 4
In People v. Ellis,47 the Illinois Supreme Court for the first time
since the ratification of the 1970 Constitution set down a defini-
tive interpretation of article I, section 18. Ellis was convicted of
forgery and burglary at the age of 17. Section 2-7(1) of the Juve-
nile Court Act 4" authorized prosecution of 17 year old males and
18 year old females under the criminal laws of the state. Ellis
persuaded the appellate court that the age discrimination against
males violated the prohibition against sex discrimination. The
supreme court agreed that the age distinction was unconstitu-
tional but decided the appropriate remedy was elimination of the
18 year old provision applicable to females and affirmed the con-
viction.
Shortly after Ellis was decided, the Illinois high court once
again had an occasion to expound on the scope of article I, section
income producing spouse unconstitutional. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) the
Supreme Court found systematic exclusion of women from juries unconstitutional; not on
equal protection grounds but because it violates the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury. See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). Three gender classifications have
withstood constitutional challenges since Frontiero: Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
(upheld a property tax granted to widows only); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(upheld a California policy excluding coverage for unemployment compensation for cer-
tain disabilities resulting from pregnancy); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (a
nine year promotion or discharge policy which applied only to male officers was upheld
against equal protection claims).
45. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
46. See notes 34-38 supra.
47. 57 Ill.2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
48. Law of July 31, 1967, ch. 37, § 702-7(1) [19671 Ill. Laws 2360, as amended, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(1) (1973).
[Vol. 25:385
ILLINOIS EQUAL PROTECTION
18 in a case involving sexual-based disabilities to marry without
the consent of a parent. In Phelps v. Bing,4" a unanimous court
speaking through Chief Justice Underwood held invalid the sec-
tion of the Marriage Act which required males to be 21 to obtain
a license to marry without parental consent while allowing fe-
males to obtain the license at 18. Speaking of the scope of con-
stitutional protection against sex discrimination embodied in
section 18, Justice Underwood, repeating language in Ellis, said
the section "was intended to supplement and expand guaranties
of the equal protection provision of the [federal] bill of rights"5"'
by making any classification based on sex suspect. As in Ellis, the
court determined that the appropriate remedy would be to elimi-
nate the higher age requirement and extend the lesser age re-
quirement to both males and females.
Several appellate court decisions have followed the holding of
Ellis regarding the gender distinction embodied in the Juvenile
Court Act.5 In addition, this decision has produced expressions
of doubt at the appellate court level over the continued validity
of any gender presumption in favor of one spouse in custody pro-
ceedings.5
The appellate courts are divided, however, in their evaluations
of the sex based distinction between aggravated incest and ordi-
nary incest contained in the Illinois Criminal Code. Section 11-
10 defines "aggravated incest" as an act of sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual conduct committed by a "male person" with a
person he knows is his daughter. Aggravated incest is a Class II
felony with a maximum prison term of 20 years. 3 Sexual relations
between mother and son or brother and sister are punishable as
ordinary incest, a Class III felony punishable by a maximum of
10 years imprisonment.54
49. 58 Ill.2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974).
50. Id. at 35, 316 N.E.2d at 776.
51. See People v. Lawrence, 26 Ill.App.3d 685, 325 N.E.2d 363 (1st. Dist. 1975); People
v. Robinson, 23 Ill.App. 3d 466, 319 N.E.2d 260 (4th Dist. 1974); People v. Schanuel, 22
I1.App.3d 174, 317 N.E.2d 279 (5th Dist. 1974); People v. Jones, 21 IlI.App.3d 791, 315
N.E.2d 921 (1st Dist. 1974); People v. Keister, 21 Ill.App.3d 351, 315 N.E.2d 293 (2d Dist.
1974); People v. Gunn, 21111. App.3d 233, 315 N.E.2d 186 (1st. Dist. 1974).
52. Randolph v. Dean, 27 Ill.App.3d 913, 327 N.E.2d 473 (3d Dist. 1975); Anagnosto-
poulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill.App.3d 479, 317 N.E.2d 681 (1st Dist. 1974).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-10 (1973).
54. Id. § 11-11.
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The Fourth District Appellate Court examined this classifica-
tion in People v. Boyer.55 The defendant was convicted of aggra-
vated incest under section 11-10 and sentenced to one to five
years imprisonment. He challenged the conviction as an uncon-
stitutional gender classification under article I, section 18.
The court found the gender classification contained in the ag-
gravated incest section invalid as a suspect classification which
could not understand the requirement of strict judicial scrutiny
and found no compelling reason for imposing a stronger penalty
on father-daughter incest than was imposed on mother-son in-
cest. Both situations give rise to the same biological risk and the
possibility of abusing family authority. Legal and cultural tradi-
tions alone could not justify the distinction in the face of a consti-
tutional requirement of equal treatment of the sexes. Applying
the remedial approach of Ellis, the Boyer court affirmed the con-
viction.
In contrast, the first and fifth district appellate courts have
affirmed aggravated incest convictions against sex discrimination
claims without resorting to the reasoning of the Boyer majority.
In People v. Williams," a first district decision, the gender dis-
tinction embodied in the aggravated incest section was held to
satisfy the standard of strict scrutiny applicable to sexual dis-
criminations under article I, section 18 of the state constitution.
Speaking for a unanimous court Justice Stamos found that "com-
pelling considerations" supported the legislative decision to treat
incest between a father and daughter more seriously than other
incestuous conduct, including sexual relations between a mother
and son. These considerations were the increased harm from un-
wanted pregnancy where the victim is a female child, the greater
frequency of father-daughter incest prosecutions, and the greater
psychological harm that occurs when a father sexually abuses a
female child. Thus the court determined that the social harm
involved in father-daughter relationships was greater and that a
more severe punishment was necessary to deter the class of of-
fenders who most often commit the offense.
Much of this analysis is inadequate. The fact that most incest
55. 24 Ill.App.3d 671, 321 N.E.2d 312 (4th Dist. 1975). See also People v. Yocum, 31
Il1.App.3d 586, 335 N.E.2d 183 (1975).
56. 29 Ill.App.3d 547, 336 N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1975).
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prosecutions involve fathers who have sexual relations with their
daughters supports including such conduct in the criminal defini-
tion of incest but does not support punishing that form of incest
more severely than other forms. It is the imposition of a more
severe punishment for a crime of incest that only males can com-
mit that needs to be justified, not the imposition of punishment
for incestuous conduct itself.
Different punishment for incest on the basis of the gender of the
parent is reasonable if the harm to the female child victim is
greater than the harm to the male child in mother-son incestuous
relationships. The First District Appellate Court in Williams said
that it is not "subject to serious debate that the physical and
psychological dangers of intercourse are greater when inflicted
upon a female child."57 It is not quite so clear as the opinion
suggests that the psychological harm to a female child from sex-
ual relations with her father is greater than harm to a male child
from sexual relations with his mother. This unsupported
conclusion brings the state judiciary dangerously close to adopt-
ing by judicial notice generalized propositions about a more frag-
ile emotional and psychological structure in female children.
Without significant support in empirical studies such pronounce-
ment by the judiciary should be eschewed lest courts unwittingly
contribute to the problem that article I, section 18 of the state
constitution was designed to eliminate. 8
It was also suggested in Williams that the harm from unwanted
pregnancies is greater to a female child. This appears to be a
credible line of analysis. Unfortunately the First District Appel-
late Court does not develop the point more thoroughly. An un-
wanted pregnancy would seem to have significant adverse effects
on the future educational and career choices of a female child; the
effect of an unwanted pregnancy is less severe on the mother
whose life does not so much lie ahead of her. Further, the mother
is not an unwilling victim of incest as may be the case of a female
child in a father-daughter incestuous relationship. Finally, it may
also be that there is a greater risk of physical harm from preg-
nancy to youthful females.
57. Id. at 551, 336 N.E.2d at 30.
58. Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) with Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
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An additional ground for sustaining convictions for aggravated
incest was profferred in Williams and in a fifth district case,
People v. York." This rationale suggests that no sex discrimina-
tion is embodied in the distinction between aggravated and ordi-
nary incest. The classification was said not to be based "upon sex
alone." Since a male may be convicted of ordinary incest for
sexual relations with his sister the court concluded that the more
severe penalties were levied against fathers and stepfathers be-
cause of their positions in the family and not solely because they
were males. 6
The imposition of more severe punishment on fathers who have
sexual relations with their daughters is a discrimination on the
basis of sex if language is to mean anything. Only males have the
family position of fatherhood which is the basis of the more severe
punishment. Moreover, the fact that only males who are fathers
are subject to the section does not detract from the essential
sexual basis of the statutory scheme of the incest provisions. To
limit sex discrimination to state action which is directed solely
and exclusively at all males or females would exempt much sex
discrimination from the state constitution's purview. Under such
criteria for example, a state law which excluded mothers from
unemployment benefits would not be "based on sex" for purpose
of article I, section 18 if unemployed females without children
were eligible for benefits. This sex-plus criteria has been rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in discrimination cases
brought under federal civil rights statutes.6'
The courts in Boyer, Williams and York are confronted with
problems which are the apparent result of an inflexible statutory
policy. Incest prosecutions for father-daughter sexual relations
must be brought under the higher felony statute or not at all.
Therefore, courts are forced to review a gender classification
which if found unconstitutional would leave Illinois with a void
in the criminal law on incest between father and daughter. In the
alternative, courts will be forced to create remedial measures
59. 29 Ill.App.3d 113, 329 N.E.2d 845 (5th Dist. 1975).
60. The court in Williams does not emphasize this ground as a basis of decision and
by so doing seems to recognize the tortured reasoning which the argument involves.
61. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) rev'g, Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
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similar to those in Ellis"2 and Bing,"3 and thus, completely inter-
ject themselves in the heretofore legislative sphere of criminal
law. The factual record of the three incest cases dramatically
illustrates the need for regulation of incestuous relationships be-
tween father and daughter. However, if constitutional policy
against sex discrimination is to have any bite in Illinois the higher
punishment imposed for such conduct needs more justification
than provided in the opinions.
Implications of Rigid Scrutiny under Section 18
In Ellis and Bing the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted article
I, section 18 of the Illinois Constitution to place gender distinc-
tions embodied in state action on the same basis as race distinc-
tions under the Federal Constitution. By so doing, the Illinois
Supreme Court has incorporated the rigid scrutiny-suspect classi-
fication concepts of federal equal protection. The scope of "rigid
judicial scrutiny" in such cases is embodied in the requirement
that the state show that such classifications are necessary to fur-
ther a compelling state interest. State government units are not
absolutely prohibited from taking constitutionally suspect traits
into account in distributing benefits and burdens, but the com-
pelling state interest concept severely circumscribes the situa-
tions when to do so would be constitutional.
From an evaluation of United States Supreme Court cases
employing the compelling state interest standard several rather
clear propositions have emerged. A three step analysis is adopted
by the Supreme Court in rigid scrutiny cases. First, the articu-
lated interest asserted by the state must be a permissible objec-
tive of the police power.64 For example, if the Supreme Court
determines that the purpose of the governmental action is to chill
the exercise of a constitutional right, the action will be impermis-
sible.65 Second, the interest must be significant." The Supreme
Court has held on several occasions that a state interest in admin-
istrative or economic efficiency is not significant enough to be
62. 57 I11.2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
63. 58 I1l.2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974).
64. Compare Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) with United States Dep't of Agri. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
65. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
66. Id.; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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compelling under rigid scrutiny analysis.67 Third, the method
used to promote this significant interest must be necessary." The
Supreme Court had held that if a less detrimental alternative
method for promoting the interest is available to the state, the
law in question is unconstitutional.69 The force of these latter
holdings is to raise grave constitutional doubts about any law
which over or under reaches if it is directed at a suspect class. By
extending the federal standard of rigid judicial scrutiny in sus-
pect classification cases to gender classifications, the Illinois Su-
preme Court has imposed a heavy burden of justification on the
state as well as broad duties and responsibilities on the judiciary.
Implications of Remedial Approach
Having determined that the gender distinction embodied in the
Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutional under article I, section
18, the Illinois Supreme Court in Ellis faced the question of what
remedy was required. The court indicated that several alterna-
tives were available. The 18 year old policy applicable to females
could have been extended to males, thus making the conviction
illegal or the policy could have been eliminated altogether, thus
sustaining the conviction. In deciding on the latter alternative,
the court relied heavily on the fact that since the conviction of
Ellis the state legislature had amended the statute, eliminating
the age distinction based upon gender to read "no minor who was
under 17 years of age."7
Support for broad judicial discretion in granting remedial alter-
natives after a determination that the constitutional rights of a
person challenging government action have been violated may be
found in Brown v. Board of Education.7 In the first Brown deci-
sion the United States Supreme Court ordered reargument on the
issue of appropriate relief. After reargument the Court decided
against immediate relief in favor of the controversial "all deliber-
ate speed" formula. The decision to delay relief in Brown was
contrary to the proposition embodied in several Supreme Court
67. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
68. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
69. Id.; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
70. 57 Ill.2d at 133, 311 N.E.2d at 101.
71. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
[Vol. 25:385
ILLINOIS EQUAL PROTECTION
decisions which indicated that constitutional rights are "personal
and present."72 Quite obviously, the severely criticized Brown
implementing decision" was based upon practical assessments of
the impact of an instant integration order on the affected school
systems.
The problems confronted by a court in a case like Ellis are far
removed from those confronting the United States Supreme
Court in Brown, and the denial of immediate relief to a plaintiff
who has been prosecuted pursuant to an unconstitutional statute
should not be entered into lightly. One of the purposes of a consti-
tutional limitation on government action such as that embodied
in article I, section 18, is to discourage the use of gender as a basis
for the imposition of criminal responsibility. Constitutional limi-
tations on legislative power are not self-enforcing. Through the
case and controversy requirement an injured party utilizing re-
sources in challenging legislation plays a valuable role in enforc-
ing constitutional policy. A decision like Ellis, which denies a
party who successfully challenges criminal legislation on consti-
tutional grounds immediate relief, hardly encourages other defen-
dants subject to unconstitutional gender discriminations to vigor-
ously assert constitutional defenses.
In Ellis, of course, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with a
legislature that had exorcised the unconstitutional gender classi-
fication from the statute by amendment. This factor influenced
the court's selection of a remedy. When this is not the situation
courts will hopefully consider alternatives other than elimination,
when to do so would further constitutional policy.
Elimination of the unconstitutional gender classification will
not always result in a decision which discourages the vigorous
assertion of constitutional defenses. In Phelps v. Bing,74 the effect
of the elimination of the gender distinction was to remove the
disability against marriage and grant the relief sought by the
male plaintiff.
72. See Hartman, U.S. Supreme Court and Desegregation, 23 MODERN L. REV. 353
(1960); Note, Supreme Court Equity Discretion: The Decrees in the Segregation Cases,
64 YALE L. J. 124, 127 (1954).
73. See note 72 supra. Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem
in Nullification, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (1963).
74. 58 Ill.2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974). Compare the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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An example of where the elimination remedy utilized in Ellis
causes considerable problems is found in People v. Boyer."5 As
previously discussed,"6 the court in Boyer found the aggravated
incest section under which the defendant was convicted an un-
constitutional gender classification. Applying the elimination
principle of Ellis and Bing, however, the court affirmed the con-
viction and remanded the case to the circuit court with instruc-
tions to resentence the defendant under the lesser penalty provi-
sion of ordinary incest.
Justice Smith, in dissent," challenged the application of the
elimination principle of Ellis and Bing to affirm the conviction.
He noted that ordinary incest is inapplicable to the acts charged
against the defendant-sexual intercourse between a father and
daughter. Thus the effect of the majority decision was to impose
a penalty on the defendant for ordinary incest, a crime for which
he was not found guilty and could not have been tried. Applica-
tion of the elimination principle to produce results such as oc-
curred in Boyer is highly questionable. The most rudimentary
principles of due process are abandoned if punishment is imposed
for a crime that the defendant did not or could not have commit-
ted. As suggested by Justice Smith in dissent, if the court found
the statute unconstitutional under section 18 it had no choice but
to reverse the conviction. Such a result would have been more
consistent with both due process and the strong constitutional
policy against gender classifications embodied in the state consti-
tution.
State Action Designed to Undo Past Discrimination Against
Women
As previously noted, sex classifications are treated as interme-
diate level scrutiny cases under the federal equal protection
clause." The result of this type of scrutiny is to give public au-
thority more flexibility in taking gender into account in the distri-
75. 24 I1l.App.3d 671, 321 N.E.2d 312 (4th Dist. 1975).
76. See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
77. 24 IIl.App.3d at 674, 321 N.E.2d at 315. Justice Smith further disagreed with the
majority by taking the position that the prosecution for aggravated incest was not a
discrimination of the basis of sex.
78. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 25:385
ILLINOIS EQUAL PROTECTION
bution of benefits or burdens. Slight over or under inclusiveness
in the distribution of a benefit to women for purposes of undoing
the effects of past discrimination may satisfy federal equal pro-
tection standards. One United States Supreme Court case at
least strongly supports this proposition. In Kahn v. Shevin, six
Justices of the court affirmed the constitutionality of a Florida
tax exemption which was granted widows and not widowers. The
exemption was supported by general statistical data showing sig-
nificant disparities in the income producing abilities of men and
women both generally and within job categories. The Court con-
cluded that given this data the exemption bore a fair and sub-
stantial relationship to Florida's interest in reducing the income
disparity between men and women produced by past discrimina-
tion against women. Given this purpose the exemption
overreached in that widows who were not needy received it and
under reached in that other needy women not widows, did not.
Yet under federal intermediate scrutiny the gender classification
withstood equal protection claims.
After Ellis, an Illinois tax exemption similar to the Florida tax
exemption in Kahn v. Shevin, would be of questionable constitu-
tionality under article I, section 18. Public authority is more lim-
ited under a rigid scrutiny-compelling state interest analysis;
over or under inclusiveness is constitutionally fatal.'" The suspect
status of gender classification in Illinois thus restricts state gov-
ernment action to rectify past discrimination against women to
a greater extent than would be the case if the state were subject
only to fourteenth amendment equal protection restraints. This
does not mean, of course,. that such governmental programs in
Illinois are prohibited totally under article I, section 18. They are
not. Illinois clearly has a significant interest in undoing the ef-
fects of past discrimination against women. Article I, section 18,
would seem to require, however, that such programs be carefully
and precisely drawn so as to avoid over or under reaching as much
as possible.
79. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
80. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1961).
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Illegitimacy in Illinois: Intermediate Scrutiny
Illegitimate children share many of the characteristics of those
groups who enjoy the protection of the suspect classification con-
cept in equal protection adjudications. Illegitimacy, like race,
nationality, and alienage, is an accident of birth for which the
child is not responsible; illegitimacy has and still involves stigma-
tization of the child as inferior. Illegitimate children are a small,
politically disadvantaged, discrete and insular minority. Discrim-
inations against them have been formalized in cases and statutes
and thus, to some extent, have been endorsed by the legal system.
Illegitimate children have fared poorly with the majoritarian leg-
islative process as their age prohibits participation in the political
arena and works against their championing their own rights.
These considerations undoubtedly contributed to the initial
invalidation of legal discrimination against illegitimate children
by the United States Supreme Court in 1968 in Levy v.
Louisiana."' The Court in Levy found unconstitutional a Louis-
iana law which prevented illegitimate children who had not been
acknowledged by their father from receiving wrongful death bene-
fits. Since Levy the United States Supreme Court has struck
down state statutes discriminating against illegitimate children
in workmen's compensation and support benefits in Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"2 and Gomez v. Perez,3 as well as
federal discriminations in social security in Jiminez v.
Weinberger.4
Levy, Weber, Gomez, and Jiminezs5 all contain language sug-
81. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968),
a companion case, invalidated the same statute involved in Levy.
82. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
83. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
84. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). In New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619
(1973), the Court in a per curiam opinion found a New Jersey statute limiting benefits of
the "assistance to families of the working poor" program to families where the children
were legitimate violative of the equal protection clause. Disabilities worked on illegiti-
mates have been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in other settings. See
Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), aff'd 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Griffin v.
Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.), aff'd 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
85. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) the Court stated:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed throughout the ages society's condem-
nation of irresponsible liasons beyond the bounds of marriage. But visiting this
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, impos-
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gesting that scrutiny in such cases is licensed because
illegitimacy is an accident of birth which stigmatizes the children
as inferior. Yet none of these four recent cases held that illegiti-
macy is a suspect class. Rather, illegitimacy, like sex, was ap-
proached by a majority of the Supreme Court as a classification
which licensed some degree of intermediate scrutiny. The classifi-
cation warranted more justification than occurs in pure economic
regulation cases but a somewhat lesser degree of judicial scrutiny
than in a suspect classification case.
The rather clear development of constitutional protection for
illegitimates from Levy to Jiminez was interrupted in 1971 by one
case, Labine v. Vincent. 6 The Supreme Court there sustained the
constitutionality of a Louisiana law which prevented illegitimate
children, whether acknowledged or not, from acquiring property
from the natural father if he died intestate.
Quite recently a case involving facts somewhat distinguishable
from Labine v. Vincent reached the Illinois high court. In In re
Estate of Karas7 the Illinois Supreme Court entertained both
state and federal constitutional challenges against Illinois law
which precluded acknowledged illegitimate children from inherit-
ing from a parent who died intestate. Justice Kluczynski, speak-
ing for a unanimous court, found the statute constitutional fol-
lowing the strict holding of Labine.
The petitioner and an amicus brief"8 argued that discrimina-
tions against illegitimates in intestate succession were subject to
the rigid scrutiny standard of suspect classifications under the
federal equal protection clause because the impact of the law was
ing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
legal system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously no child is responsible for his birth and
penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of
deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent social opprobrium suffered
by those helpless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to
strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth alone where-as in
this case-the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest-
compelling or otherwise.
See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968).
86. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
87. 61 Ill.2d 40, 329 N.E. 2d 234 (1975).
88. An extensive, well-reasoned amicus brief was filed by the Legal Assistance Founda-
tion of Chicago. The Illinois Supreme Court referred to the brief throughout the opinion.
1976]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
to discriminate against racial minorities and because illegitimacy
was a suspect class. Justice Kluczynski responded to the federal
equal protection rigid scrutiny claims by relying almost exclu-
sively on Labine. He noted that the impact analysis had been
similarly made and rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in Labine and concluded that, absent any racial classification in
the statute itself, strict judicial scrutiny did not apply. Moreover,
since the state court could not expand the scope of federal consti-
tutional protections beyond United States Supreme Court inter-
pretations and since the federal high court had not granted illegi-
timacy suspect classification status, those arguments were also
rejected by the justice.
The court also rejected the invitation to view the case as an
unconstitutional sex discrimination. Petitioners had argued that
Probate Act policies allowing illegitimate children to inherit from
mothers who die intestate and which prevented fathers but not
mothers from inheriting from the illegitimate child's estate if he
or she dies intestate, constituted sex discriminations in violation
of article I, section 18 of the state constitution.89 Justice Kluczyn-
ski found these arguments unpersuasive as raised by illegitimate
children and concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing
to assert a claim of sexual discrimination based upon a law which
was directed at their parents' sex. This limited holding suggests
that sections 12(4), 12(5), and 12(7) of the Probate Act which
distinguish between fathers and mothers of illegitimate children
in regard to intestate succession policy may be challenged on sex
discrimination grounds in a case where the parent claims direct
injury.
Residual federal equal protection arguments relating to the
continued vitality of Labine in view of subsequent Supreme
Court illegitimacy decisions were also rejected by the court. Jus-
tice Kluczynski noted that Labine had been cited with approval
and distinguished in the cases invalidating discriminations
against illegitimates in distribution of workmen's compensation,
support and social security benefits. Citing Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., the court noted that Labine "reflected,
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973) reads: "An illegitimate child is heir of his mother
and of any maternal ancestor, and of any person from whom his mother might have
inherited, if living. .. .. "
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in major part, the traditional deference to a State's prerogative
to regulate the disposition at death of property within its bor-
der. '"90 Intestate succession law exempting illegitimate children
from rights did not create "insurmountable barriers" to inheri-
tance by the acknowledged illegitimate child since the father
could marry the child's mother or execute a will including the
child.
Applying the traditional, rational basis federal equal protection
standard to the case, the court concluded that the discrimination
against illegitimates was rationally related to Illinois' interest in
encouraging family relationships and establishing a method of
property dispositions which protects against spurious claims and
assures stability of title.
Labine v. Vincent, upon which the Illinois Supreme Court re-
lied both in reasoning and result in Karas, has provoked a spate
of criticism since it was decided in 1971.1, The controversy focuses
primarily on whether the general approach and reasoning in that
case is consistent with other cases where the United States Su-
preme Court has invalidated discriminations against illegitimate
children on equal protection grounds. In these decisions involving
grants of public largess, the Court clearly employed an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny. It is also clear that the overall thrust of these
cases is to raise serious doubts as to the continued vitality of
many of the stereotyped historical prejudices against illegitimate
children which were part of past social practices and embraced
in the common law.
90. 61 Ill.2d. at 47, 329 N.E. 2d at 238.
91. See Pascal, Louisiana Succession and Related Law and the Illegitimate: Thoughts
Prompted by Labine v. Vincent, 46 TUL. L. REV. 167 (1971); Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent,
Illegitimates, Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REV. 377 (1971);
Turton, Unequal Protection of the Illegitimate Child, 13 S. TEXAS L.J. 126 (1972); Note,
Labine v. Vincent: Louisiana Denies Intestate Succession Right to Illegitimates, 38
BROOKLYN L. REV. 428 (1971); Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of the
Laws-Inheritance by Illegitimates, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793 (1971); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Denial of Illegitimate Child's Right of Inheri-
tance from Father Who Had Acknowledged But Not Legitimatized Heir Does Not Consti-
tute a Violation of Child's Equal Protection Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 47
N.D. LAW. 392 (1971); Comment, Why Bastards, Wherefore Bastards? 25 Sw. L.J. 659
(1971); Comment, Constitutional Law-Illegitimacy-The Emasculation of Equal
Protection for "Bastards," 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 316 (1971); Comment, Inheritance
Law-Illegitimacy-A State's Intestate Succession Statutes Denying Illegitimate Chil-
dren Benefits Granted Legitimates Violates Neither Equal Protection Nor Due Process,
49 TEXAS L. REV. 1132 (1971).
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The facile conclusion that discrimination against illegitimates
in intestate succession laws is different than discriminations in
the distribution of social security, support, workmen's
compensation or wrongful death benefits because the former in-
volves distribution of property which is part of a decedent's estate
and does not involve permanent deprivation of the child's interest
is beset with insurmountable difficulties. Levy v. Louisiana,2 for
example, which began Supreme Court intervention in this area,
involved a Louisiana statute that precluded only illegitimate
children who had not been acknowledged by the father from re-
ceiving wrongful death benefits. Thus, the voluntary act by the
father of acknowledging the children would result in distribution
of the property interest to the child. Yet the statute was found
unconstitutional. To distinguish Labine from Levy on the basis
that the father could have granted the child an interest in the
estate by writing a will and thus no "insurmountable barrier" to
the child receiving the benefit existed is highly questionable.
Moreover, several United States Supreme Court cases clearly
state that permanent deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest is not a necessary element for an equal protection claim. 3
There are also considerable difficulties with distinguishing the
cases on the basis that Labine involved the state's interest in
estates. If, for example, the limitation on illegitimate children
inheriting intestate is said to promote the state's interest in sta-
bility of title to property, this interest is not implicated where the
father has acknowledged parentage. If instability in title to prop-
erty is the result of difficulty in proving parentage, then this
problem has to some extent been alleviated by recent scientific
developments. 4
It has been suggested that the exclusion of illegitimates from
intestate rights furthers the state's interest in distributing prop-
erty in accordance with the intent of the owner, because it is
reasonable to assume that the deceased would prefer not to leave
property to an illegitimate child. Such an assumption, however,
92. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
93. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
94. L. SUSSMAN, BLOOD GROUPING TESTS (1968); Ross, The Value of Blood Tests in
Paternity Cases, 71 HARV. L. REV. 466 (1958).
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seems to be premised on certain prejudiced attitudes about illegi-
timacy that the Levy, Jiminez line of cases were responses to.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Karas also suggested that the
intestate succession policy promoted the state's interest in en-
couraging marriage and discouraging illegitimacy. It is highly
dubious to assume that persons who enter into extramarital rela-
tionships consider whether the offspring of that relationship will
receive property in the event the father dies without a will."5
Moreover, it is unfair to impose disabilities on the innocent child
of unmarried persons in order to regulate his parents' conduct.
Finally, alternative methods for regulating sex conduct or encour-
aging marriage, such as tax incentives, are clearly available.
Labine v. Vincent is a five to four United States Supreme Court
decision with shaky underpinnings. It is highly doubtful that the
decision will be extended beyond its facts. The seventh circuit
and at least one other federal district court have denied its cur-
rent vitality." There is nothing in Karas which suggests that the
Illinois Supreme Court will be inclined to sustain government
discriminations directed at illegitimates outside the narrow area
of intestate succession. Leading federal decisions invalidating
discriminations against illegitimate children were cited with ap-
proval. Karas will not change the Illinois Constitution which
seems to clearly impose an obligation on the state judiciary in
interpreting the Illinois equal protection clause to closely scruti-
nize distinctions against illegitimates17
EQUAL PROTECTION LIMITATIONS ON STATE ECONOMIC POLICY AND
POWER TO DEFINE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not
forget today, that there is no more effective practical guarantee
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require
that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a
95. The United States Supreme Court has totally discredited this rationale in Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
96. Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975); Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F.Supp. 1117
(D. Md. 1973).
97. An example of current Illinois law discriminating against illegitimate children may
be found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, §§ 8-158, 11-153 (1973) which eliminates illegitimate
children's rights to child annuity benefits under municipal pension funds.
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minority be imposed generally. Conversely nothing opens the
door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow these officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus to escape the political retributions that might be vis-
ited upon them if larger members were affected. Courts can take
no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require
that laws be equal in operation."
Selective Close Scrutiny: Lochnerism in Illinois
Perhaps the most dramatic divergence in the scope of protec-
tion between the federal and state constitution is in the area of
discriminatory exercises of police power which affect property
and contract interests. At the federal level there is virtually no
fourteenth amendment substantive limitation on the power of the
states or federal government to initiate policy through legislation
in order to regulate economic units. This is, of course, not the case
if the policy treats racial, national, or sexual groups differently
or discriminates against aliens or illegitimate children. But in
terms of substantive limitations on economic regulations, it is a
fact that only one exercise of police power at the state and federal
level has been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
solely on substantive, economic due process or equal protection
grounds since 1937.11
This lowly constitutional status of individual economic inter-
ests traces back to a period in the history of the United States
Supreme Court generally said to extend from 1905 to 1937. During
this period, substantive review was actively employed on behalf
of fifth and fourteenth amendment due process, equal protection,
property, and liberty claims to find state and federal legislation
98. Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson J., concurring
opinion).
99. That one case is Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (act which exempted American
Express Co. money orders from regulation and licensing held unconstitutional). See H.
ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 8-28 (2d ed. 1972); Strong, The Economic Philosophy
of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 419 (1973). Some
substantive limitations on state economic policy still are imposed by the supremacy and
interstate commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Procedural limits have been imposed under the four-
teenth amendment in the economic area. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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unconstitutional. Symbolic of this era is Lochner v. New York,"",
in which a New York statute establishing maximum hour limita-
tions on the weekly employment of bakers was found unconstitu-
tional. The effect of extensive use of economic, substantive due
process and equal protection was to blunt state and federal police
power designed to deal with exploitation of workers in industry
and to cure the economic ills of the great depression.
It was during the "Lochner" era that the Court as an institu-
tion was most severely criticized. President Roosevelt's attempt
to deal with federal judicial obstacles to the New Deal through a
court packing plan failed. New appointments to the Court and
changes of position by some Justices produced West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish,'' at 1937 decision in which Chief Justice Hughes, and
Justices Roberts, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone found a
minimum wage law for women and children constitutional and
effectively brought an end to economic, substantive due process
and equal protection.
In Illinois, however, "Lochnerism" has been maintained since
1937 by the high court's use of both the special legislation prohibi-
tions and equal protection limits under the 1870 and 1970 Consti-
tutions. In addition, federal due process and equal protection
were employed by the Illinois Supreme Court to limit state police
power to regulate economic units."2 In Grasse v. Dealers Trans-
port Co.,'"3 a 1952 decision, for example, the Illinois Supreme
Court found a section of the state Workmen's Compensation Act
unconstitutional. They held that the legislation violated the
equal protection and special legislation provisions of the Illinois
Constitution as well as the equal protection and due process
clauses of the federal constitution. The portion of the section in
issue based the right of employees injured in the course of em-
ployment to elect to sue under common law negligence on
whether the third-party tortfeasor was bound by the Workmen's
100. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
101. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
102. See Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill.2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592 (1971) rev'd
sub nom. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356 (1973); People v. McCabe,
49 Ill.2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971); Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill.2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968);
People ex. rel. Toman v. Chicago Union Station, Co., 383 Ill. 153, 48 N.E.2d 524 (1943).
103. 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
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Compensation Act. The effect of this section' 3 ' was to treat em-
ployees injured within the course of employment differently de-
pending on the driver and vehicle driven by the tortfeasor. For
example, an employee injured by a farmer's truck would have
significantly different rights than one injured by a bus. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court found the distinctions embodied in the sec-
tion unreasonable, given the purpose of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, which is to impose liability without fault on employers
by virtue of the master-servant relationship and the employers
superior ability to insure against the risk.'"32
Another Illinois case illustrative of the use of constitutional
review in economic regulation cases is Fiorito v. Jones, 4 a 1968
decision. In that case several amendments to legislation which
taxed occupations and services were found unconstitutional. The
effect of the amendments was to exclude from taxation some
service businesses and service persons such as laundries, dry
cleaners, and physicians who possessed the same relevant traits
as those taxed, namely, they rendered a service which involved
the incidental transfer of property. Since the tax failed to treat
businesses, which were similarly situated in terms of the purpose
of the tax, in the same manner, the tax violated equal protection
guaranties of the state and federal constitution.
In additiofi, the court found the tax legislation constitutionally
infirm because the tax was based upon the gross receipts of the
service business. This fact, concluded the court, made the exemp-
tions even more arbitrary. The result would be, for example, that
an auto repairman who charged $51, which included the instal-
lation of a one dollar spark plug, would be taxed on the entire $51
under a gross receipt tax base approach. This type of tax would
only significantly further a purpose to tax a service, yet other
service professions such as the practice of medicine were excluded
from tax coverage. Given this analysis there was no rational basis
for some of the exclusions contained in the amendments to the
acts.
103.1. Section 29 of the 1947 Workmen's Compensation Act was in issue.
103.2. 412 Ill. 179, 196, 106 N.E.2d 129, 133 (1952).
104. 39 I1I.2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968).
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People v. McCabe,'°5 involved a successful substantive
constitutional challenge to laws outside the realm of economic
intervention. McCabe was convicted of unlawful sale of mari-
juana. Pursuant to provisions in the criminal code providing for
mandatory minimum penalties, the defendant, who had no prior
conviction, was sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of 10
years to 10 years and a day. The defendant argued that constitu-
tional deficiencies existed because marijuana was classified with
hard drugs under the Narcotic Drug Act rather than the Drug
Abuse Control Act which carried lesser penalties. After a
lengthly, detailed comparative analysis of the drugs regulated in
the two statutes with marijuana, the court concluded that the
properties and effects of hard drugs such as opiates and cocaine
on users differ considerably from those of marijuana. Therefore,
there was no reasonable basis for classifying marijuana under the
harsher Narcotic Drug Act.
In finding classification of marijuana as a hard drug in viola-
tion of equal protection,'06 the Illinois Supreme Court essentially
reviewed the factual assumptions about the effect of marijuana
which underly its regulation. People v. McCabe involved tech-
niques of constitutional substantive review which have generally
been discarded by the federal judiciary in the post-Lochner era.
As the court in McCabe noted, a substantial body of scientific
and medical opinion is now available concerning the effect of
marijuana and there is little reason why such evidence properly
presented to a court ought not to be taken into account where
relevant to the exercise of substantive review. Nevertheless, re-
view of the legislative facts in a substantive challenge to state
definitions of crime and punishment is highly unusual in both the
state and federal system. 10
The Special Legislation Prohibition
Recent decisions employing the special legislation provisions of
105. 49 Ill.2d 338,275 N.E.2d 407 (1971).
106. The court held that the classification violated the equal protection limitations of
both the federal and Illinois Constitutions. In addition, McCabe contains dicta that the
classification also violated the special legislation prohibition. Id. at 350, 275 N.E. 2d at
413. Justices Underwood and Ryan dissented.
107. Numerous federal and state court decisions have rejected constitutional attacks on
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the 1970 Constitution to find legislation unconstitutional strong-
ly suggest that Lochnerian constitutional review in areas of eco-
nomic regulation by the Illinois high court is going to continue to
be very much a part of constitutional law in this state.
Section 22 of article IV of the 1870 Constitution prohibited the
enactment of a special law in many numerated instances and
concluded: "In all other cases where a general law can be made
applicable, no special law shall be enacted."10 The prohibition
against special legislation was carried over in article IV, section
13, of the 1970 Constitution which states, "The General Assembly
shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be
made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applic-
able shall be a matter for judicial determination."'' 9
The Illinois Supreme Court found the state's no-fault legisla-
tion unconstitutional in Grace v. Howlett.'l1 A new provision enti-
tled Compensation of Automobile Accident Victims"' was added
to the Illinois Insurance Code which required automobile liability
insurance to include some no-fault benefits. Section 60811 of the
code placed a dollar limitation on recovery for pain and suffering,
mental anguish, and inconvenience in actions arising out of the
use of motor vehicles in cases other than death, dismemberment,
permanent disability, or serious disfigurement. Companion sec-
tion 60011 of the Code provided basic no-fault benefits to persons
federal and state statutes classifying marijuana with the "hard drugs." Indeed, successful
substantive equal protection attacks on the tenth amendment police power to define crime
or punishment are virtually non-existent at the federal court level. See United States v.
Eramdjian, 155 F.Supp. 914 (S. D. Cal. 1957); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 293
(1965); Borras v. State, 229 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1969); People v. Keyes, 117 Ill.App.2d 471,
253 N.E. 2d 537 (1st. Dist. 1969); Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898
(1969); State v. White, 153 Mont. 193, 456 P.2d 54 (1969); Spence v. Sacks, 173 Ohio 419,
183 N.E.2d 363 (1962); Gonzales v. State, 373 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. 1963). A few courts
have found constitutional deficiencies in the classification of marijuana as a hard drug.
See English v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va. 1972); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91,
194 N.W.2d 878 (1972); State v. Zornes, 78 Wash.2d 9, 469 P.2d 9 552 (1970). See also
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (judicial review of legislative facts).
108. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
109. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
110. 51 Ill.2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
111. Law of Sept. 2, 1971, ch. 73, §§ 1065.150 et seq. [1971] Ill. Laws 2542 (repealed
1975).
112. Id. at 2548.
113. Id. at 2542-43.
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injured in accidents with non-commercial business vehicles. The
combined effect of the General Damage Limitation in section 608
and the specific exemption of commercial vehicles from no-fault
benefits produces several anomalous consequences. If, for exam-
ple, two persons received identical injuries in separate automo-
bile collisions the rights of the person negligently injured by a
business delivery vehicle would be quite different from the rights
of a person injured by a person negligently driving the family
automobile. The first party injured by the commercial vehicle
would not receive any payment under the no-fault benefits of
section 600 and would have to prove a common law tort suit. Yet,
despite the fact that these people received no benefits under the
no-fault plan, they suffered the burdens of the statute because
their common law right to recover for pain and suffering was
severely limited. The court found that the exemption for commer-
cial vehicles and their accident victims from the benefits of the
statute violated the prohibition against special legislation in sec-
tion 13 of article IV of the 1970 Constitution.
The special legislation analysis of the court in Grace v.
Howlett"' proceeded along the following lines. The special legisla-
tion prohibition in the 1970 Constitution does more than simply
restate the judiciary's role under the equal protection provision
of the new constitution. Section 13 of article IV has limited the
scope of legislative experimentation with special legislation and
increased judical responsibility for determining whether a general
law "is or can be made applicable.""' Since the mischief the
legislation was designed to eliminate is present when exempted
vehicles such as buses, taxicabs, or trucks cause personal injury,
a general law applicable to all cases tainted with the mischief can
be made available. The no-fault law thus constituted prohibited
special legislation."'
Other Illinois Supreme Court cases involving laws as special
legislation under the 1970 Constitution have recognized the ex-
114. 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
115. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. See note 38 supra. The court also found that other
provisions in the code violate the 1970 constitutional guarantees of trial by jury and the
constitutonal provisions relative to the scope of original jurisdiction for circuit courts.
116. 51 Ill.2d at 488, 283 N.E.2d at 479.
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panded role of the judiciary in exercising constitutional review in
special legislation disputes."7 In People ex rel. East Side Levee
& Sanitary Dist. v. Madison City,"8 the supreme court found a
1972 statutory amendment altering and expanding sanitary dis-
tricts in two counties unconstitutional as special legislation in
violation of article IV, section 13 of the 1970 Constitution. Relying
primarily on Grace v. Howlett and dicta in Bridgewater v.
Holtz" ' the court reaffirmed its view that section 13 altered tradi-
tional deference granted the legislature in determining whether
a general law could be held applicable. Applying the constitu-
tional standard for special legislation, the court found no reasons
for restricting the advantages of the statute to just two districts.
Special Legislation: Under Inclusiveness
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the reasoning in Grace
v. Howlett is that the court adopts a standard for constitutional
review in special legislation cases which is drastically different
from the federal equal protection standard. Under the special
legislation standard the essential inquiry is whether a "general
law can be made available." A primary effect of this inquiry is
to license broad judicial review of laws which under reach in the
sense that such laws are only directed at some of the persons
tainted with the mischief the law is designed to eliminate. At the
federal level it is clear that the equal protection clause does not
license broad judicial review of legislation which deals with prob-
lems "one step at a time" where only property interests are af-
fected. Two United States Supreme Court cases illustrate the
difference between the federal equal protection standard and the
state special legislation standard.
In Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc.,"" in 1955, the Supreme
Court upheld an Oklahoma law which limited persons who could
lawfully fit lens or replace frames to licensed optometrists or
117. In Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill.2d 103, 281 N.E.2d 317, (1972) the Illinois Supreme
Court sustained statutes establishing different periods of voter registration in different
counties against special legislation claims but cited added judicial responsibility under
the special legislative provision in the 1970 Constitution.
118. 54 Ill.2d 442, 298 N.E.2d 177 (1973).
119. 51 Ill.2d 103, 281 N.E.2d 317 (1972).
120. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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ophthalmologists and thus effectively put opticians out of busi-
ness in that state. A lower federal court had found that the Okla-
homa law violated equal protection in part because it exempted
sellers of ready-to-wear glasses. Reversing the district court, a
unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Douglas, stated that although the statute under reached by ex-
empting ready-to-wear glasses, legislative reform may take "one
step at a time" and that the legislature may select "one phase of
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the other."''
21
A second dramatic example of under inclusive legislation which
satisfied equal protection is found in Railway Express Agency v.
New York, " a 1949 Supreme Court case in which a New York law
prohibiting paid advertisement on a vehicle, unless it was adver-
tising the business of the vehicle's owner, was upheld. The law
was designed to eliminate distractions and promote safety in the
use of streets by pedestrians and automobiles. The fact that
signs on business vehicles or roadside advertisements would also
be distractive, yet were not prohibited, did not make the
legislation in violation of equal protection. The state action was
constitutionally permissible as long as it reached some of the
persons who were tainted with a mischief which could be regu-
lated within the scope of tenth amendment police power.
Justice Schaefer recognized the difference in scope of constitu-
tional review under the special legislation provision and federal
equal protection principles in Grace v. Howlett and specifically
rejected the "one step at a time" approach of Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc. in article IV, section 13 cases.'
A most illustrative example of the difference between federal
equal protection standards and state special legislation standards
may be found by examining litigation involving the constitution-
ality of laws requiring employers to pay employees for time off of
work on election day. A Missouri law penalizing employers for
deducting employees wages for being absent for four hours on
election day was sustained by the United States Supreme Court
against equal protection claims in the 1952 decision of Day-Brite
121. Id. at 489.
122. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
123. 51 Ill. 2d at 478, 283 N.E.2d at 479.
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Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri.'4 The statute was designed to elimi-
nate obstacles to the exercise of voting rights. Given this purpose,
the statute overreached in that every employee who took leave of
work for a period of time on election day had to be paid whether
or not he in fact voted. In addition, the employee had to be paid
for the time away from work whether or not he spent the entire
time exercising his right to vote. The statute also under reached
in that non-employee voters were not encouraged to vote by gov-
ernment economic "incentives." A nearly unanimous Court
brushed aside these difficulties and affirmed the constitutionality
of the law, saying to do otherwise would be to return to the philos-
ophy of Lochner.
In 1955 when the Illinois Supreme Court dealt with a similar
Illinois law the court took an opposite posture and found the
Illinois pay-while-voting statute unconstitutional basing its
opinion on the protection against "special legislation." In
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing,'25 the Illinois
Supreme Court relied heavily on the analysis of the dissenting
opinion in Day-Brite Lighting.' The primary infirmity of the
statute was that in providing for increased election participation
it was under inclusive. Self-employed persons, those who work for
fees and commission, housewives, and farmers who work during
the day were not included in the statute. Yet the exercise of the
franchise by many of these workers may be inhibited to the same
extent as wage earners by financial or other limitations. Thus, the
pay-while-voting statute constituted prohibited special legisla-
tion. Under the Illinois Constitution the legislature could not deal
with this problem "one step at a time."
An Evaluation of Lochnerism in Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court has taken a major stride in ridding
itself of some of the strictures of a rigid non-interventionist post-
Lochner philosophy toward constitutional review in cases involv-
ing property or contract interests and definition of crime and
punishment under the police power. This path taken by the court
124. 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
125. 6 I11.2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955).
126. 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952)(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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is not without its risks and difficulties.
Lochner is one of the most thoroughly discredited decisions of
the Supreme Court. Yet, while there is general agreement that
the Court went wrong, there is a great deal of disagreement about
precisely what that wrong was. If there is a leading view, it proba-
bly is that the primary evil of Lochner was in the attempt by the
Court to, "fasten on the country . . . a pattern of economic
regulation believed by the Court to be essential to the fullest
development of the nation's economy."'' 7 Only Justice Holmes,
in dissent, was to stress that view. Other suggestions on the evils
of Lochner are: (1) that the Court was adopting a subjective
natural law interpretation of the Constitution;' 8 (2) that substan-
tive review in that era was irregular and unprincipled;' 9 (3) that
the Court was substituting its notion of the purpose of police
power for the government's articulated purpose;'30 (4) that the
Court was implying rights wholecloth from the Constitution;' 3' (5)
that protection of economic interests by constitutional review
sacrificed the Courts primary responsibility in protecting funda-
mental personal rights and discrete and insular minorities.'32 To
these might also be added the judicial technique of setting aside
legislative or societal facts which prompted the legislation. Some
of the criticisms of the United States Supreme Court in the dis-
credited interventionist era may be applied to the present Illinois
court's employment of constitutional review under the 1970 Con-
stitution.
Sometimes in economic regulation cases the constitutional re-
view in Illinois resembles a debate between economists over desir-
able policy,' 3 rekindling the ghost of Justice Holmes' famous
admonition in dissent in Lochner that the constitution was "not
intended to embody a particular economic theory."' 34 An example
127. Strong, supra note 99.
128. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
129. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
130. Tribe, Foreward: Toward A Model of Rules in the Due Process of Life and Law,
87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973).
131. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920
(1973).
132. United States, v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
133. See Bloom v. Mahin, 61 Ill.2d 70, 329 N.E.2d 213. (1975).
134. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of this is found in Bloom v. Mahin,'35 where equal protection and
special legislation challenges to a regressive graduated tax dis-
count based upon volumes of revenue stamps purchased were
rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court. In affirming the constitu-
tionality of the statute, the court cited a Justice Cardozo state-
ment in a Lochner era decision summarizing a diminishing re-
turns kind of economic theory which said that when a certain
degree of volume is reached efficiency in cost per unit decreases.
Given this theory the Illinois Supreme Court concluded in Bloom
that the graduated tax discount furthered the statutory purpose
of shifting the "cost of collection" to the purchaser.
It also may be said that the Illinois Supreme Court selectively
intervenes in a way that is not always consistent or principled in
the economic regulation area. Some under inclusive classifica-
tions have recently withstood special legislation challenges in
cases not readily distinguished from Grace v. Howlett.' The
same can be said of equal protection and special legislation chal-
lenges to criminal prosecutions stimulated primarily by McCabe.
Numerous such challenges to criminal prosecutions reached the
appellate court level and lost in the 1974-75 term alone.'37
To some extent, inconsistency in the exercise of constitutional
review seems to be inherent in judicial assumption of broad con-
stitutional responsibilities in the economic regulation area. The
purposes which may be a proper basis for the exercise of police
power are almost infinite. Much regulatory legislation designed
to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of citizens is less
than perfectly reasonable. A state court does not have the re-
sources to closely scrutinize the reasonableness of every law en-
acted by state or municipal legislatures; nor would it be desirable
for that to happen.
Governing units need some discretion for experimentation in
economic policy and crime control. Therefore the fact that inter-
vention is selective is not a sufficient reason by itself for not
135. 61 Il1.2d 70, 329 N.E.2d 213 (1975).
136. See, e.g., id. Delaney v. Badame, 49 Ill.2d 168, 274 N.E.2d 353 (1971).
137. See, e.g., People v. Borlow, 58 Ill.2d 41, 317 N.E.2d 49 (1974); People v. Henninger,
28 Ill.App.3d 557, 328 N.E.2d 580 (4th Dist. 1975); People v. Warfield, 26 1ll.App.3d 772,
326 N.E.2d 211 (1st Dist. 1975); People v. Mitchell, 26 Ill.App.3d 300, 325 N.E.2d 93 (5th
Dist. 1975).
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permitting review in the economic area. The legislature ought to
be allowed to experiment on the one hand and the courts check
against palpably preferential or unreasonable exercise of police
power on the other hand without provoking a constitutional crisis
at the state level.
There is good reason to be concerned about a great deal of
constitutional review in the economic regulation area where the
price paid is the erosion of the court's effectiveness in exercising
its primary responsibility to protect fundamental personal rights
and government discriminations -directed at discrete and insular
minorities. Constitutional review under the special legislation
provision should not be exercised at the expense of basic liberties.
Such is the delicate tightrope that the Illinois Supreme Court
must walk under the heavy and complex responsibilities imposed
by the prohibition against special legislation in the 1970 Illinois
Constitution. The future promises to be one of judicial activism
and controversy.
CONCLUSION
The 1870 Illinois Constitution was interpreted by the Illinois
Supreme Court to expand rights beyond federal equal protection
in the area of governmental discrimination directed solely at
property and contract interests. This was accomplished chiefly by
relying on the constitutional prohibition against special legisla-
tion. Recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
prohibitions against special legislation and the equal protection
clauses of the 1970 Constitution have invalidated the classifica-
tion of marijuana as a hard drug as well as no-fault legislation.
These decisions suggest a continuation of the expansion of rights
beyond federal equal protection in the area of governmental dis-
crimination of economic interests. In addition, the new 1970 con-
stitutional language directed specifically at sex discrimination
has been interpreted by the supreme court to grant sex-based
discriminations the status of "suspect" classification, demanding
rigid scrutiny by the courts. This important development places
Illinois in a unique position among the states. Not surprisingly,
state appellate courts with virtually no federal or state precedents
to guide them, have reached anomalous and contradictory inter-
pretations of gender-based discriminations.
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Several factors have contributed to the secondary role that
state constitutions generally play in protecting individuals
against governmental discrimination. The supremacy of the Fed-
eral Constitution prevents state constitutions from granting more
power to state governments to discriminate than is allowed under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. State
courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction over federal consti-
tutional claims. Thus, even in cases initiated in state courts
against governmental discriminations, federal equal protection
plays a dominant role. Although a state may not restrict federal
constitutional rights, a state constitution may expand rights
against governmental discriminations at the state level. In the
area of expanding constitutional protection, the Illinois constitu-
tion plays a significant role.'38
138. The California Supreme Court has also interpreted the state constitution to grant
suspect status to sex discrimination. See Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 485 P.2d 529,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971), compare Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 60 (1971) with San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Yet
despite the opportunity for expansion it is probably the case that state constitutional
equal protection provisions will not be generally interpreted by state judges to give greater
rights than those given by federal equal protection.
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